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## **Abstract**

It is widely recognised that system complexity poses the major threat to dependability. Yet, such complex distributed systems as multi-agent systems are increasingly used in critical applications. To ensure their dependability, we need powerful development techniques that would allow us to master complexity inherent to multi-agent systems and formally verify correctness of agent interactions while performing safety-critical collaborative activities. In this paper we propose a rigorous approach to the development of a critical multi-agent system by refinement in Event-B. Our approach offers the developers a scalable method for modelling and verification of complex agent interactions and formal verification of their correctness and safety. We present a formal development of a hospital multi-agent system and show that refinement in Event-B facilitates development of complex dependable systems.

**Keywords:** Event-B, refinement, formal modelling, multi-agent systems, safety

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# 1 Introduction

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are complex decentralised distributed systems composed of agents asynchronously communicating with each other. Agents are computer programs acting autonomously on behalf of a person or organisation, while coordinating their activities by communication [10]. MAS are increasingly used in various critical application such as factories, hospitals, rescue operations in disaster areas etc. However, the wide-spread use of MAS is hindered by the lack of methods for ensuring their dependability.

In this paper we focus on studying complex agent interactions while conducting safety-critical collaborative activities. In critical MAS, incorrect execution of these activities might have devastating consequences.

In this paper we consider a hospital MAS. We focus on modelling how main safety-critical collaborative activities – handling emergency situations (caused by the occurrence of sudden critical conditions of a patient) and updating patients records. Obviously, incorrect execution of these activities might lead to patient’s death. Hence, there is a clear need for a development method that would guarantee correct provision of these operations.

However, ensuring correctness in a hospital MAS is a challenging issue due to faults caused by agent disconnections, dynamic role allocation (different shifts of medical personnel) and autonomy of the agent behaviour. To address these challenges, we need the system-level modelling approaches that would support formal verification of correctness and facilitate discovery of restrictions that should be imposed on a system to guarantee its safety.

In this paper we demonstrate how to develop a critical MAS by refinement in Event-B. Event-B [2, 11] is a formal framework for developing complex systems. The main development technique of Event-B is refinement – a process of a gradual transformation of an abstract specification into a specification directly translatable into an implementation. Correctness of each refinement step is verified by proofs. The Rodin platform [12] provides the developers with an automated tool support for constructing and verifying formal system models.

In our development we adopt a system’s approach, i.e., abstractly model the entire system, so that the specifications of its individual components can be obtained from it by decomposition. At each refinement step we introduce certain details of complex agent interaction and prove the essential conditions associated with them.

The formal verification process facilitates not only safety assurance but also discovery of restrictions that should be imposed on the system behaviour to guarantee its safety. We believe that the formal development in Event-B offers a scalable technique for development and verification of complex critical MAS.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present our formal modelling framework – Event-B. In Section 3 we describe a hospital MAS and show how to abstractly model a MAS and introduce fault tolerance by refinement. In




Figure 1: Event-B machine and context

Section 4 we show how to introduce complex collaborative agent interactions by refinement and verify their safety. Finally, in Section 5 we overview the related work, discuss the achieved results and outline the future work.

## 2 Formal Modeling and Refinement in Event B

We start by briefly describing our development framework. The Event-B formalism is an extension of the B Method [1], a state-based formal approach that promotes the correct-by-construction development paradigm and formal verification by theorem proving. Event-B is actively used within the FP7 ICT project DEPLOY to develop dependable systems from various domains [3].

### 2.1 Modelling and Refinement in Event B

In Event-B, a system specification (model) is defined using the notion of an *abstract state machine* [11]. An abstract state machine encapsulates the model state, represented as a collection of model variables, and defines operations on this state. Therefore, it describes the dynamic part (behaviour) of the modelled system. A machine may also have the accompanying component, called *context*, which contains the static part of the system. In particular, a context can include user-defined carrier sets, constants and their properties, which are given as a list of model axioms. A general form of Event-B models is given in Figure 1.

The machine is uniquely identified by its name  $M$ . The state variables,  $v$ , are declared in the **Variables** clause and initialised in the *Init* event. The variables are strongly typed by the constraining predicates  $I$  given in the **Invariants** clause. The invariant clause might also contain other predicates defining properties that should be preserved during system execution.

The dynamic behaviour of the system is defined by the set of atomic events specified in the **Events** clause. Generally, an event can be defined as follows:

$$\mathbf{evt} \hat{=} \mathbf{any} \ vl \ \mathbf{where} \ g \ \mathbf{then} \ S \ \mathbf{end}$$

Action ( $S$ )	$BA(S)$
$x := E(x, y)$	$x' = E(x, y) \wedge y' = y$
$x \in Set$	$\exists z \cdot (z \in Set \wedge x' = z) \wedge y' = y$
$x :  P(x, y, x')$	$\exists z \cdot (P(x, z, y) \wedge x' = z) \wedge y' = y$

Figure 2: Before-after predicates

where  $vl$  is a list of new local variables (parameters), the guard  $g$  is a state predicate, and the action  $S$  is a statement (assignment). In case when  $vl$  is empty, the event syntax becomes **when  $g$  then  $S$  end**. If  $g$  is always true, the syntax can be further simplified to **begin  $S$  end**.

The occurrence of events represents the observable behaviour of the system. The guard defines the conditions under which the action can be executed, i.e., when the event is *enabled*. If several events are enabled at the same time, any of them can be chosen for execution non-deterministically. If none of the events is enabled then the system deadlocks.

In general, the action of an event is a parallel composition of assignments. The assignments can be either deterministic or non-deterministic. A deterministic assignment,  $x := E(x, y)$ , has the standard syntax and meaning. A non-deterministic assignment is denoted either as  $x \in Set$ , where  $Set$  is a set of values, or  $x :| P(x, y, x')$ , where  $P$  is a predicate relating initial values of  $x, y$  to some final value of  $x'$ . As a result of such a non-deterministic assignment,  $x$  can get any value belonging to  $Set$  or according to  $P$ .

**Event-B Semantics** The semantics of an Event-B model is formulated as a collection of *proof obligations* – logical sequents. Below we describe only the most important proof obligations that should be verified (proved) for the initial and refined models. The full list of proof obligations can be found in [2].

The semantics of Event-B actions is defined using so called before-after (BA) predicates [2, 11]. A before-after predicate describes a relationship between the system states before and after execution of an event, as shown in Figure 2. Here  $x$  and  $y$  are disjoint lists (partitions) of state variables, and  $x', y'$  represent their values in the after-state.

The initial Event-B model should satisfy the event feasibility and invariant preservation properties. For each event of the model,  $evt_i$ , its feasibility means that, whenever the event is enabled, its before-after predicate (BA) is well-defined, i.e., exists some reachable after-state:

$$A(d, c), I(d, c, v), g_i(d, c, v) \vdash \exists v' \cdot BA_i(d, c, v, v') \quad (\text{FIS})$$

where  $A$  is model axioms,  $I$  is the model invariant,  $g_i$  is the event guard,  $d$  are model sets,  $c$  are model constants, and  $v, v'$  are the variable values before and after the event execution.

Each event  $evt_i$  of the initial Event-B model should also preserve the given model invariant:

$$A(d, c), I(d, c, v), g_i(d, c, v), BA_i(d, c, v, v') \vdash I(d, c, v') \quad (\text{INV})$$

Since the initialisation event has no initial state and guard, its proof obligation is simpler:

$$A(d, c), BA_{Init}(d, c, v') \vdash I(d, c, v') \quad (\text{INIT})$$

Event-B employs a top-down refinement-based approach to system development. Development starts from an abstract system specification that models the most essential functional requirements. While capturing more detailed requirements, each refinement step typically introduces new events and variables into the abstract specification. These new events correspond to stuttering steps that are not visible at the abstract level. Moreover, Event-B formal development supports data refinement, allowing us to replace some abstract variables with their concrete counterparts. In that case, the invariant of the refined machine formally defines the relationship between the abstract and concrete variables.

To verify correctness of a refinement step, we need to prove a number of proof obligations for the refined model. For brevity, here we show only a few essential ones.

Let us first introduce a shorthand  $H(d, c, v, w)$  to stand for the hypotheses  $BA(d, c), I(d, c, v), I'(d, c, v, w)$ , where  $I, I'$  are respectively the abstract and refined invariants. Then the invariant preservation property for an event  $evt_i$  of the refined model can be presented as follows:

$$H(d, c, v, w), g'_i(d, c, w), BA'_i(d, c, w, w') \vdash I'(d, c, w') \quad (\text{REF\_INV})$$

where  $g'_i$  is the refined guard,  $BA'_i$  is a before-after predicate of the refined event, and  $v, w$  are respectively the abstract and concrete variables.

The event guards in the refined model can be only strengthened in a refinement step:

$$H(d, c, v, w), g'_i(d, c, w) \vdash g_i(d, c, v) \quad (\text{REF\_GRD})$$

where  $g_i, g'_i$  are respectively the abstract and concrete guards of the event  $evt_i$ .

Finally, the *simulation* proof obligation requires to show that the "execution" of the refined event is not contradictory with its abstract version:

$$H(d, c, v, w), g'_i(d, c, w), BA'_i(d, c, w, w') \vdash BA_i(d, c, v, v') \quad (\text{REF\_SIM})$$

where  $BA_i, BA'_i$  are respectively the abstract and concrete before-after predicates of the same event  $evt_i$ .

The Event-B refinement process allows us to gradually introduce implementation details, while preserving functional correctness. The model verification effort, in particular, automatic generation and proving of the required proof obligations, is significantly facilitated by the Rodin platform [12]. Proof-based verification as well as reliance on abstraction and decomposition adopted in Event-B



offers the designers a scalable support in the development of such complex distributed systems as multi-agent systems. Next we demonstrate our approach to formal modelling of a multi-agent system in Event-B.

### 3 Abstract Modelling of a Hospital MAS

#### 3.1 A case study description

In this paper we present a formal development of a hospital MAS. The system consists of two types of agents – patients and medical personnel (called doctors for simplicity). The condition of each patient is monitored by the corresponding medical equipment – an agent representing a patient. The doctor agents are running on Pocket PC-based devices – Personal Digital Assistants (PDA). The hospital provides the wireless connectivity to the doctor agents. Each doctor is associated with one agent. From now on, we will use the terms ”patient” and ”doctor” to designate both agents and people that they represent.

The medical equipment continuously updates in the patient’s medical record consisting of different medical measurements and detects emergencies – dangerous changes of critical parameters (e.g., blood pressure, pulse rate and etc.). In case of emergency, the patient agent generates an emergency call that is communicated to the doctors treating the patient. An important safety requirement imposed on the system is that *all emergencies should be promptly handled by the doctors*. In spite of its seeming simplicity, this requirement is hard to ensure. Indeed, a MAS operates in a volatile communication environment, i.e., agents might experience temporal disconnections. Hence the design of our system should incorporate certain fault tolerance mechanisms that would guarantee that each emergency call is eventually handled by some doctor. Moreover, different doctors can be associated with the same patient during different shifts. Therefore, we have to ensure that at the end of a doctor’s shift all his/her patients are handed over to another doctor.

Another important safety requirement associated with the system is to guarantee that *a doctor always accesses the most recent patient record and the patient’s data are always kept in a consistent state*. We assume that the patient record is stored at the equipment associated with her. To ensure that these requirements are satisfied, we should regulate the access to the patient’s data. A specific delivery of a medicine, prescription of a treatment and so on are introduced into the patient’s log by the medical personnel via their PDAs. To ensure that the data are updated consistently we only allow the doctor to modify patient’s data when he or she is in a close proximity to the patient. When the doctor arrives to the patient location, the patient data become available at the doctor’s PDA and the doctor can modify them. All the modifications are synchronised with the data stored by the patient’s equipment. When the doctor finishes examining the patient or delivering

a medicine and leaves, the connection to the patient’s data is lost. Such a restriction allows us to ensure that only a doctor who is in a close proximity to a patient is allowed to modify the patient’s record. Moreover, it also ensures that the doctor has the access to the freshest info about the patient. This precludes, e.g., a possibility of delivering the medicine twice.<sup>1</sup>

The safety-critical requirements imposed on the system should be fulfilled in the course of complex agent interactions. Next we demonstrate how refinement process in Event-B can facilitate modelling of intertwined agent interactions and verification of safety properties.

### 3.2 Towards modelling agent interdependencies

Our abstract specification – the machine *Hospital* shown in Fig. 3 – is very simple. It models the behaviour of the entire hospital MAS in a highly abstract way. We define the variable *med\_agents* – the set of active agents of the type *MEDSTAFF*. The events *Activate* and *Deactivate* model joining and leaving the hospital location by the agents. While an agent is active, it can perform certain activities which is abstractly modelled by the event *Activity*.

```

Machine Hospital
Variables med_agents
Invariants
  inv1 : med_agents ⊆ MEDSTAFF
Events
  Initialisation ≜
    begin
      med_agents := ∅
    end
  Activate ≜
    any ma
    when
      ma ∈ MEDSTAFF
      ma ∉ med_agents
    then
      med_agents := med_agents ∪ {ma}
    end
  Activity ≜
    then
      skip
    end
  Deactivate ≜
    any ma
    when
      ma ∈ med_agents
    then
      med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    end

```

Figure 3: Hospital: abstract specification

<sup>1</sup>Modeling the security requirements ensuring patient’s data integrity is outside of the scope of this paper.

In our first refinement step (the excerpt from which is shown in Fig. 4) we augment our model with representation of patients. The variable *patients* defines a set of patients admitted to the hospital. Each patient arriving at the hospital is associated with a doctor who has a primary responsibility for treating the patient. To model the interdependence between patients and medical personnel we introduce the variable *assigned\_doctor*, which is defined as total function associating patients with active doctor agents. In addition, we add the new events *PatientArrival* and *PatientDischarge* to model patient arrival and discharge from the hospital correspondingly.

```

Machine Hospital1 Refines Hospital
Variables ... patients, assigned_doctor, last_visit, visited
Invariants
  inv1 : patients ⊆ PATIENTS
  inv2 : assigned_doctor ∈ patients → med_agents
  inv3 : last_visit ∈ patients ↔ MEDSTAFF
  inv4 : visited ⊆ patients
  inv5 : last_visit[visited] ⊆ med_agents
  inv6 : visited ⊆ dom(last_visit)
Events
  ...
  PatientArrival ≐
    any ma, pa
    when
      pa ∈ PATIENTS ∧ pa ∉ patients ∧ ma ∈ med_agents
    then
      patients := patients ∪ {pa}
      assigned_doctor(pa) := ma
    end
  VisitBegin ≐
    Refines Activity
    any ma, pa
    when
      ma ∈ med_agents ∧ pa ∈ patients ∧ pa ∉ visited ∧ ma ∉ last_visit[visited]
    then
      last_visit(pa) := ma
      visited := visited ∪ {pa}
    end
  AgentLeaving ≐
    Refines Deactivate
    any ma
    when
      ma ∈ med_agents ∧ ma ∉ ran(assigned_doctor) ∧ ma ∉ last_visited[visited]
    then
      med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    end
  ReassignDoctor ≐
    Refines Deactivate
    any ma, ma_new
    when
      ma ∈ ran(assigned_doctor) ∧ ma ∉ last_visited[visited] ∧
      ma_new ∈ med_agents ∧ ma_new ≠ ma
    then
      med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
      assigned_doctor := assigned_doctor ⋄ (dom(assigned_doctor ▷ {ma}) × {ma_new})
    end
  ...

```

Figure 4: Hospital: the first refinement step

Moreover, in the refined specification we also elaborate on the event *Activity*. Essentially, the medical personnel should examine the patients and deliver the prescribed medicine. We generalise these actions under the general term "visiting a patient". In our refined model, we define the variable *visited* representing a subset of patients that are currently being examined. The new variable *last\_visited* stores for every patient the id of the last doctor agent that has visited her. The events *VisitBegin* and *VisitEnd* refine the abstract event *Activity* and model the visiting procedure.

In our abstract specification we have assumed that doctor agents can leave the hospital at any time. However, to guarantee safety of the patients, we must impose certain restrictions on when the doctors can actually leave the hospital. Before a doctor agent can leave the hospital, we should reassign his/her patients to another doctor. Moreover, we assume that the doctor cannot leave the hospital in the middle of a patient visit. We split the abstract event *Deactivate* into two corresponding events: *AgentLeaving* and *ReassignDoctor*. The event *AgentLeaving* models leaving the location by a doctor. Here we check that the doctor does not have any assigned patients and is not currently involved in examining a patient.

Due to a lack of space, we show only the excerpts from our formal specifications. The complete specifications can be found in the Appendix.

### 3.3 Introducing fault tolerance by refinement

In the specification *Hospital1*, while defining the events *AgentLeaving* and *ReassignDoctor*, we have abstracted away from the reasons behind of doctor leaving and patient reassignment. Essentially, a doctor agent might leave the location because the doctor's shift is over or because the agent has irrecoverably failed and should be permanently disconnected. At the second refinement step we introduce a distinction between the normal agent leaving and its disconnection due to failure.

In a MAS, the agents often lose connection only for a short period of time. After the connection is restored, the agent should be able to continue its operations. Therefore, after detection a loss of connection, the location should not immediately disengage the disconnected agent but rather set a deadline before which the agent should reconnect. If the disconnected agent restores its connection before the deadline then it can continue its normal activities. However, if the agent fails to do so, the location should permanently disengage the agent.

To model such a behaviour, in our next refinement step shown in Fig. 5 we introduce the variable *disconnected* representing the subset of active agents that are detected as disconnected. Moreover, to model the timeout mechanism, we define the variable *timer* of the type  $\{inactive, active, timeout\}$ . Initially, for every active agent, the *timer* value is set to *inactive*. As soon as active agent loses connection with the location, its id is added to the set *disconnected* and its timer value be-

comes *active*. This behaviour is specified in the new event *DisconnectAgent*. A temporally disconnected agent can succeed or fail to reconnect as modelled by the events *ReconnectionSuccessful* and *ReconnectionFailed* respectively. If the agent reconnects before the value of timer becomes *timeout*, the timer value is changed to *inactive* and the agent continues its activities virtually uninterrupted. Otherwise, the agent is removed from the set of active agents.

```

Machine Hospital2 Refines Hospital1
Variables ... disconnected, timer
Invariants
  inv1 : disconnected ⊆ med_agents
  inv2 : timer ∈ med_agents → STATE
  inv3 : ∀ma. (ma ∈ med_agents ∧ timer(ma) ≠ inactive ⇔ ma ∈ disconnected)
Events
  ...
  DisconnectAgent ≐
    any ma
    when
      ma ∈ med_agents ∧ ma ∉ disconnected
    then
      disconnected := disconnected ∪ {ma}
      timer(ma) := active
    end
  ReconnectionFailed ≐
    any ma
    when
      ma ∈ disconnected ∧ timer(ma) = active
    then
      timer(ma) := timeout
    end
  DetectFailedAgent ≐
    Refines ReassignDoctor
    any ma, ma_new
    when
      ma ∈ ran(assigned_doctor) ∧ ma ∉ last_visited[visited] ∧ ma_new ∈ med_agents ∧
      ma_new ≠ ma ∧ ma ∈ disconnected ∧ timer(ma) = timeout ∧
      ma_new ∉ disconnected ∨ (ma_new ∈ disconnected ∧ timer(ma_new) = active)
    then
      med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
      assigned_doctor := assigned_doctor ⋄ (dom(assigned_doctor ▷ {ma}) × {ma_new})
      disconnected := disconnected{ma}
      timer := {ma} ⋄ timer
    end
  DetectFailedFreeAgent ≐
    Refines AgentLeaving
    any ma
    when
      ma ∈ med_agents ∧ ma ∉ ran(assigned_doctor) ∧ ma ∉ last_visited[visited] ∧
      ma ∈ disconnected ∧ timer(ma) = timeout
    then
      med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
      disconnected := disconnected{ma}
      timer := {ma} ⋄ timer
    end
  ...

```

Figure 5: Hospital: the second refinement step

The introduction of an agent disconnection also affects the some abstract events. To model separate case of doctor leaving the location because of the end of shift or due to the disconnection timeout, we split the event *AgentLeaving* into two events *NormalAgentLeaving* and *DetectFailedFreeAgent*. Moreover, if a disconnected agent has the associated patients, we have to reassign them to another doctor. Hence, similarly with a *AgentLeaving*, the event *ReassignDoctor* is decomposed into two events *NormalReassignDoctor* and *DetectFailedAgent*.

## 4 Ensuring Correctness of Cooperative Agent Actions

### 4.1 Modelling emergency calls

Our next refinement step introduces abstract modelling of the emergency calls, that are generated by patient monitoring equipment. We must ensure that each call will be properly handled by a corresponding doctor.

We introduce the variable *emergency\_calls*, which is defined as a partial function associating the emergency calls with the patients. Moreover, we define the variable *accepted\_calls* that establishes the correspondence between the emergency calls and the doctors that answer them.

At this refinement step we abstract away from the actual implementation of how a doctor is chosen to handle an emergency call. A detailed model of it will be introduced at the next refinement step. Here we add new events *EmergencyCall* and *HandlingEmergencyCall* to abstractly model occurrence of an emergency and finding a responsible doctor to handle it. In addition, we distinguish two types of patient visit – a regular visit (scheduled examination or delivery of a medicine) and a visit for handling an emergency call. To model it we decompose the event *VisitBegin* into the events *RegularVisitBegin* and *EmergencyVisitBegin*.

We define a system variant to ensure that the newly introduced events *EmergencyCall* and *HandlingEmergencyCall* do not take the control forever. We define the variant as follows:

$$card(ALARMS \setminus dom(emergency\_calls)) + card(ALARMS \setminus dom(accepted\_calls)),$$

and prove that it is decreased by new events. An extract from the machine *Hospital3* is shown in Fig. 6.

### 4.2 Introducing a procedure to select a doctor in emergencies

In the previous refinement step we have introduced modelling of emergency calls and non-deterministic assignment of the responsible doctors to handle them. The goal of our next refinement step is to introduce a detailed procedure of selecting

```

Machine Hospital3 Refines Hospital2
Variables ... emergency_calls, accepted_calls
Invariants
  inv1 : emergency_calls ∈ ALARMS ↔ patients
  inv2 : accepted_calls ∈ ALARMS ↔ med_agents
  inv3 : dom(accepted_calls) ⊆ dom(emergency_calls)
Events
  ...
  EmergencyCall ≡
    Status convergent
    any pa, ec
    when
      pa ∈ patients ∧ ec ∈ ALARMS ∧ ec ∉ emergency_calls ∧ pa ∉ ran(emergency_calls)
    then
      emergency_calls := emergency_calls ∪ {ec ↦ pa}
    end
  HandlingEmergencyCall ≡
    Status convergent
    any ec, ma
    when
      ec ∈ emergency_calls ∧ ec ∉ ran(accepted_calls) ∧
      ma ∈ med_agent ∧ ma ∉ disconnected
    then
      accepted_calls := accepted_calls ∪ {ec ↦ ma}
    end
  ...

```

Figure 6: Hospital: the third refinement step

a doctor in case of an emergency call. It follows the steps graphically depicted in Fig. 7.

The proposed procedure can be described as follows. We start by selecting an emergency call to answer. Then we model a loop of finding a suitable candidate and sending a request to him/her. If the doctor rejects it then we choose the next candidate. The procedure is repeated until we get an acceptance on the request.




Figure 7: Procedure of choosing a doctor for a certain call

To model the described procedure, we refine the machine *Hospital3* by introducing a number of new variables and events. The event *ChooseCurrentCall* starts handling of a particular emergency call. The event *CallFeed* directs the call to the assigned doctor, while *ForwardCall* forwards the call to next suitable candidate. The events *AcceptCall* and *RejectCall* model acceptance and rejection respectively. A special event *ForcedAcceptCall* is needed to “force” the last available doctor to accept the call. To make this decision, the variable *occupied* is used to accumulate the doctors that have already refused the call (for example, a doctor is performing a surgery etc.).

We assume that the whole procedure finding a doctor for a certain emergency

call takes a short period of time and during this period no disconnection of agents can occur. As a result, we strengthen the guards in the event *DisconnectAgent* to disallow any disconnection while an emergency call is handled. An extract from the machine *Hospital4* is shown in Fig. 8.

Moreover, we define an additional system variant to ensure that event *RejectCall* is convergent, which means that eventually we get an acceptance from a doctor to answer a call. The variant is  $card(\text{med\_agents} \setminus \text{occupied})$  and it is decreased by the event.

```

Machine Hospital4 Refines Hospital3
Variables ... ec_handling, directed, candidate_found, occupied, current_call
Invariants
  inv1 : ec_handling ∈ BOOL
  inv2 : candidate_found ∈ BOOL
  inv3 : directed ∈ ALARMS ↔ med_agents
  inv4 : occupied ⊆ med_agents
  inv5 : dom(directed) ⊆ dom(emergency_calls)
  inv6 : current_call ∈ ALARMS
  ...
Events
  ...
  CallFeed ≡
    when
      ec_handling = TRUE ∧ candidate_found = FALSE ∧
      assigned_doctor(emergency_calls(current_call)) ∉ disconnected ∧
      assigned_doctor(emergency_calls(current_call)) ∉ occupied
    then
      directed(current_call) := assigned_doctor(emergency_calls(current_call))
      candidate_found := TRUE
    end
  AcceptCall ≡
    Refines HandlingEmergencyCall
    when
      ec_handling = TRUE ∧ candidate_found = TRUE ∧
      current_call ∈ dom(emergency_calls) ∧ current_call ∉ dom(accepted_calls) ∧
      directed(current_call) ∉ disconnected
    with
      ec: ec = current_call
      ma: ma = directed(current_call)
    then
      accepted_calls(current_call) := directed(current_call)
      ec_handling := FALSE
      candidate_found := FALSE
      occupied := ∅
    end
  ...

```

Figure 8: Hospital: the fourth refinement step

## 5 Data integrity

To ensure that a patient gets the correct treatment, we should guarantee that the medical personnel always access the most recent patient record. As we discussed in Section 3, we allow the doctor to access and modify the patient's data only when he/she is in a close proximity to a patient. We implement this requirement via the scoping mechanism [7, 8, 9]. A scope provide a shared data space for



a doctor and a patient. We assume that each patient agent has the scope associated with it. As soon as a doctor agent appears at a close vicinity of the patient agent, it automatically joins the scope. While in the scope, the doctor can modify the patient record (e.g., prescribe a new medicine, log the information about the delivered medicine, prescribe a new procedure etc.).

To model this behaviour, we refine the abstract events *RegularVisitBegin*, *EmergencyVisitBegin*, *VisitEnd* by the events *RegularEnterScope*, *EmergencyEnterScope*, *LeaveScope* and add a new event *ModifyRecord*. The event *ModifyRecord* models an update of the patient record by a doctor, when he/she is in the scope of a patient. Thereby we ensure here that the patient record are always up-to-date. The corresponding safety property stating that the medical personnel always access the most recent record is formulated as the invariant (*inv\_7*, Fig. 9).

```

Machine Hospital5 Refines Hospital4
Variables ... record, ma_data, scopes
Invariants
  inv1 : record ∈ patients → ℙ(DATA)
  inv2 : ma_data ∈ med_agents → ℙ(DATA)
  inv3 : scopes ∈ ScopeName ↔ med_agents
  inv4 : ∀ma·ma ∈ ran(scopes) ⇔ ma ∈ dom(ma_data)
  inv5 : ∀ma·ma ∈ disconnected ⇒ ma ∉ ran(scopes)
  inv6 : ∀ma·ma ∈ ran(visited ◁ last_visit) ⇒ ma ∈ ran(scopes)
  inv7 : ∀ma, pa·(pa ↦ ma) ∈ (visited ◁ last_visit) ⇒ ma_data(ma) = record(pa)
  inv8 : ∀pa·pa ∈ visited ⇒ last_visit(pa) ∈ ran(scopes)
  inv9 : (visited ◁ last_visit) ∈ patients ↔ med_agents
Events
  ...
  EmergencyEnterScope ≐
  Refines EmergencyVisitBegin
  any ec, sn
  when
    ec ∈ dom(accepted_calls) ∧ emergency_calls(ec) ∉ visited ∧
    accepted_calls(ec) ∉ last_visit[visited] ∧ accepted_calls(ec) ∉ disconnected ∧
    sn ∈ ScopeName ∧ sn ∉ dom(scopes) ∧
    accepted_calls(ec) ∉ ran(scopes) ∧ accepted_calls(ec) ∉ disconnected
  then
    last_visit(emergency_calls(ec)) := accepted_calls(ec)
    visited := visited ∪ {emergency_calls(ec)}
    emergency_calls := emergency_calls \ {ec ↦ emergency_calls(ec)}
    accepted_calls := accepted_calls \ {ec ↦ accepted_calls(ec)}
    directed := {ec} ◁ directed
    scopes(sn) := accepted_calls(ec)
    ma_data(accepted_calls(ec)) := record(emergency_calls(ec))
  end
  ModifyRecord ≐
  any ma, sn, pa, da_new
  when
    (sn ↦ ma) ∈ scopes ∧ pa ∈ dom(last_visit) ∧ last_visit(pa) = ma ∧
    pa ∈ visited ∧ da_new ∈ ℙ(DATA) ∧ da_new ≠ ∅
  then
    ma_data(ma) := da_new
    record(pa) := da_new
  end
  ...

```

Figure 9: Hospital: the fifth refinement step

Moreover, we introduce the variable *record* that represents the medical history for every patient. The variable *ma\_data* stores the data that appear on the doctor's PDA screen. When the doctor agent is in a close vicinity of a patient, its *ma\_data* becomes equal to the value of the patient data. Finally, we define the variable *scopes*, which is defined as a partial function associating the active scopes with the doctors participating in them. An extract from the machine *Hospital4* is shown in Fig. 9.

## 6 Conclusion

In this paper we have presented a formal development of a hospital MAS. We have focused on modelling and verification of safety for two central safety-critical activities – handling emergencies and consistent update of patient data. Ensuring correctness of these activities is especially challenging due to highly dynamic nature of a hospital, volatile error-prone communication environment and autonomous agent behaviour.

In our development we have explicitly modelled the fault tolerance mechanism that ensures correct system functioning in the presence of agent disconnections. We have verified by proofs the correctness and safety of these two activities. Formal verification process has not only allowed us to systematically capture complex requirements but also facilitated derivation of the constraints that should be imposed on the system to guarantee its safety. Indeed, while proving convergence of the emergency handling procedure, we had to explicitly state the assumptions that the system must fulfil. These assumptions can be seen as a contract that should be checked during system deployment to guarantee its safety. In our development we have also demonstrated that the scoping mechanism provides a useful abstraction for ensuring consistent update of the patient data.

The work presented in this paper is inspired by our previous work on modelling context-aware mobile agent systems [7, 8, 9] in the CAMA framework [6, 5]. Similarly to [7, 8, 9], we rely on the timeout mechanism to tolerate agent disconnections and employ the scoping mechanism to provide shared data space for patient and doctor agents. However, in this paper we have focused on modelling and verification of safety properties of complex agent interactions rather than on reasoning about general mechanisms for agent interaction with middleware.

Formal modelling of MAS has been undertaken by [14, 13, 15]. The authors have proposed an extension of the Unity framework to explicitly define such concepts as mobility and context-awareness. In our approach we also have studied the problem of ensuring access to the fresh context. However, in [14] it is solved at the level of the matching agent attributes while in our approach we rely on the scoping mechanism to achieve this.

A formal modelling of MAS for the health care in Z has been undertaken by

Gruer et al. [4]. The work has focused on specifying a multi-agent system for a medical help system. The authors aimed at studying how to formally represent agent interactions, e.g., during negotiations. In our approach we not only model the agent interactions but also formally prove their properties. Hence, our approach is especially suitable for developing critical MAS systems.

In our future work we are planning to further investigate how to model adaptive agent behaviour that depends on the surrounding context as well as explore different reconfiguration mechanisms.

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# Appendix

**MACHINE** Hospital

**SEES** c0

**VARIABLES**

med\_agents

**INVARIANTS**

inv1 :  $med\_agents \subseteq MEDSTAFF$

**EVENTS**

**Initialisation**

**begin**

act1 :  $med\_agents := \emptyset$

**end**

**Event** *Activate*  $\hat{=}$

**any**

*ma*

**where**

grd1 :  $ma \in MEDSTAFF$

grd2 :  $ma \notin med\_agents$

**then**

act1 :  $med\_agents := med\_agents \cup \{ma\}$

**end**

**Event** *Activity*  $\hat{=}$

**begin**

skip

**end**

**Event** *Deactivate*  $\hat{=}$

**any**

*ma*

**where**

grd1 :  $ma \in med\_agents$

**then**

act1 :  $med\_agents := med\_agents \setminus \{ma\}$

**end**

**END**

**CONTEXT** c0

**SETS**

MEDSTAFF

**AXIOMS**

axm1 :  $MEDSTAFF \neq \emptyset$

axm2 :  $finite(MEDSTAFF)$

**END**

**MACHINE** Hospital1

**REFINES** Hospital

**SEES** c1

**VARIABLES**

med\_agents  
patients  
assigned\_doctor  
last\_visit  
visited

**INVARIANTS**

inv1 :  $patients \subseteq PATIENTS$   
inv2 :  $assigned\_doctor \in patients \rightarrow med\_agents$   
inv3 :  $last\_visit \in patients \leftrightarrow MEDSTAFF$   
inv4 :  $visited \subseteq patients$   
inv5 :  $last\_visit[visited] \subseteq med\_agents$   
inv6 :  $visited \subseteq dom(last\_visit)$

**EVENTS**

**Initialisation**

*extended*

**begin**

act1 :  $med\_agents := \emptyset$   
act2 :  $patients := \emptyset$   
act3 :  $assigned\_doctor := \emptyset$   
act4 :  $last\_visit := \emptyset$   
act5 :  $visited := \emptyset$

**end**

**Event** *ActivateAgent*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *Activate*

**any**

ma

**where**

grd1 :  $ma \in MEDSTAFF$   
grd2 :  $ma \notin med\_agents$

**then**

act1 :  $med\_agents := med\_agents \cup \{ma\}$

**end**

**Event** *PatientArrival*  $\hat{=}$

**any**

pa



```

    ma
where
    grd1 : pa ∈ PATIENTS
    grd2 : pa ∉ patients
    grd3 : ma ∈ med_agents
then
    act1 : patients := patients ∪ {pa}
    act2 : assigned_doctor(pa) := ma
end
Event PatientDischarge ≐
any
    pa
where
    grd1 : pa ∈ patients
    grd2 : pa ∉ visited
then
    act1 : patients := patients \ {pa}
    act2 : assigned_doctor := {pa} ≪ assigned_doctor
    act3 : last_visit := {pa} ≪ last_visit
end
Event VisitBegin ≐
extends Activity
any
    ma
    pa
where
    grd1 : ma ∈ med_agents
    grd2 : pa ∈ patients
    grd3 : pa ∉ visited
    grd4 : ma ∉ last_visit[visited]
then
    act1 : last_visit(pa) := ma
    act2 : visited := visited ∪ {pa}
end
Event VisitEnd ≐
extends Activity
any
    pa
where
    grd1 : pa ∈ visited
then

```

```

        act1 : visited := visited \ {pa}
    end
Event AgentLeaving  $\hat{=}$ 
extends Deactivate
    any
        ma
    where
        grd1 : ma  $\in$  med_agents
        grd2 : ma  $\notin$  ran(assigned_doctor)
        grd3 : ma  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
    then
        act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    end
Event ReassignDoctor  $\hat{=}$ 
refines Deactivate
    any
        ma
        ma_new
    where
        grd1 : ma  $\in$  ran(assigned_doctor)
        grd2 : ma  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
        grd3 : ma_new  $\in$  med_agents
        grd4 : ma  $\neq$  ma_new
    then
        act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
        act2 : assigned_doctor := assigned_doctor  $\Leftarrow$  (dom(assigned_doctor)  $\triangleright$ 
            {ma})  $\times$  {ma_new})
    end
end
END

CONTEXT c1
EXTENDS c0
SETS
    PATIENTS
AXIOMS
    axm1 : finite(PATIENTS)
END

```

**MACHINE** Hospital2

**REFINES** Hospital1

**SEES** c2

**VARIABLES**

med\_agents  
patients  
assigned\_doctor  
disconnected  
timer  
last\_visit  
visited

**INVARIANTS**

inv1 :  $disconnected \subseteq med\_agents$

inv2 :  $timer \in med\_agents \rightarrow STATE$

inv4 :  $\forall ma \cdot (ma \in med\_agents \wedge timer(ma) \neq inactive \Leftrightarrow ma \in disconnected)$

**EVENTS**

**Initialisation**

*extended*

**begin**

act1 : med\_agents :=  $\emptyset$   
act2 : patients :=  $\emptyset$   
act3 : assigned\_doctor :=  $\emptyset$   
act4 : last\_visit :=  $\emptyset$   
act5 : visited :=  $\emptyset$   
act6 : disconnected :=  $\emptyset$   
act7 : timer :=  $\emptyset$

**end**

**Event** *ActivateAgent*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *ActivateAgent*

**any**

ma

**where**

grd1 :  $ma \in MEDSTAFF$   
grd2 :  $ma \notin med\_agents$

**then**

act1 : med\_agents := med\_agents  $\cup$  {ma}  
act2 : timer(ma) := inactive

**end**

**Event** *PatientArrival*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *PatientArrival*

**any**

pa  
ma

**where**

grd1 : pa ∈ PATIENTS  
grd2 : pa ∉ patients  
grd3 : ma ∈ med\_agents

**then**

act1 : patients := patients ∪ {pa}  
act2 : assigned\_doctor(pa) := ma

**end**

**Event** *PatientDischarge*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *PatientDischarge*

**any**

pa

**where**

grd1 : pa ∈ patients  
grd2 : pa ∉ visited

**then**

act1 : patients := patients \ {pa}  
act2 : assigned\_doctor := {pa}  $\triangleleft$  assigned\_doctor  
act3 : last\_visit := {pa}  $\triangleleft$  last\_visit

**end**

**Event** *VisitBegin*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *VisitBegin*

**any**

ma  
pa

**where**

grd1 : ma ∈ med\_agents  
grd2 : pa ∈ patients  
grd3 : pa ∉ visited  
grd4 : ma ∉ last\_visit[visited]

**then**

act1 : last\_visit(pa) := ma  
act2 : visited := visited ∪ {pa}

**end**

**Event** *VisitEnd*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *VisitEnd*

**any**

```

    pa
  where
    grd1 : pa ∈ visited
  then
    act1 : visited := visited \ {pa}
  end
Event DisconnectAgent ≐
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ med_agents
    grd2 : ma ∉ disconnected
  then
    act1 : disconnected := disconnected ∪ {ma}
    act2 : timer(ma) := active
  end
Event ReconnectionFailed ≐
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ disconnected
    grd2 : timer(ma) = active
  then
    act1 : timer(ma) := timeout
  end
Event ReconnectionSuccessful ≐
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ disconnected
    grd2 : timer(ma) = active
  then
    act1 : timer(ma) := inactive
    act2 : disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}
  end
Event NormalAgentLeaving ≐
  extends AgentLeaving
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ med_agents

```

```

    grd2 : ma ∉ ran(assigned_doctor)
    grd3 : ma ∉ last_visit[visited]
    grd4 : ma ∉ disconnected
  then
    act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    act2 : timer := {ma} ⋄ timer
  end
Event NormalReassignDoctor ≐
extends ReassignDoctor
  any
    ma
    ma_new
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ ran(assigned_doctor)
    grd2 : ma ∉ last_visit[visited]
    grd3 : ma_new ∈ med_agents
    grd4 : ma ≠ ma_new
    grd5 : ma ∉ disconnected
  then
    act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    act2 : assigned_doctor := assigned_doctor ⋄ (dom(assigned_doctor ▷
      {ma}) × {ma_new})
    act3 : timer := {ma} ⋄ timer
  end
Event DetectFailedFreeAgent ≐
extends AgentLeaving
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ med_agents
    grd2 : ma ∉ ran(assigned_doctor)
    grd3 : ma ∉ last_visit[visited]
    grd4 : ma ∈ disconnected
    grd5 : timer(ma) = timeout
  then
    act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    act2 : disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}
    act3 : timer := {ma} ⋄ timer
  end
Event DetectFailedAgent ≐
extends ReassignDoctor

```

```

any
    ma
    ma_new
where
    grd1 : ma ∈ ran(assigned_doctor)
    grd2 : ma ∉ last_visit[visited]
    grd3 : ma_new ∈ med_agents
    grd4 : ma ≠ ma_new
    grd5 : ma ∈ disconnected
    grd6 : timer(ma) = timeout
    grd7 : ma_new ∉ disconnected ∨ (ma_new ∈ disconnected ∧ timer(ma_new) =
        active)
then
    act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    act2 : assigned_doctor := assigned_doctor ◁ (dom(assigned_doctor ▷
        {ma}) × {ma_new})
    act3 : disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}
    act4 : timer := {ma} ◁ timer
end
END

CONTEXT c2
EXTENDS c1
SETS
    STATE
CONSTANTS
    inactive
    active
    timeout
AXIOMS
    axm1 : partition(STATE, {inactive}, {active}, {timeout})
END

```

**MACHINE** Hospital3

**REFINES** Hospital2

**SEES** c3

**VARIABLES**

assigned\_doctor

disconnected

med\_agents

patients

timer

emergency\_calls

accepted\_calls

last\_visit

visited

**INVARIANTS**

*inv1* :  $emergency\_calls \in ALARMS \leftrightarrow patients$

*inv2* :  $accepted\_calls \in ALARMS \leftrightarrow med\_agents$

*inv3* :  $dom(accepted\_calls) \subseteq dom(emergency\_calls)$

**EVENTS**

**Initialisation**

*extended*

**begin**

*act1* :  $med\_agents := \emptyset$

*act2* :  $patients := \emptyset$

*act3* :  $assigned\_doctor := \emptyset$

*act4* :  $last\_visit := \emptyset$

*act5* :  $visited := \emptyset$

*act6* :  $disconnected := \emptyset$

*act7* :  $timer := \emptyset$

*act8* :  $emergency\_calls := \emptyset$

*act9* :  $accepted\_calls := \emptyset$

**end**

**Event** *ActivateAgent*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *ActivateAgent*

**any**

ma

**where**

*grd1* :  $ma \in MEDSTAFF$

*grd2* :  $ma \notin med\_agents$

**then**



```

    act1 : med_agents := med_agents ∪ {ma}
    act2 : timer(ma) := inactive
end
Event PatientArrival ≐
extends PatientArrival
  any
    pa
    ma
  where
    grd1 : pa ∈ PATIENTS
    grd2 : pa ∉ patients
    grd3 : ma ∈ med_agents
  then
    act1 : patients := patients ∪ {pa}
    act2 : assigned_doctor(pa) := ma
  end
Event PatientDischarge ≐
extends PatientDischarge
  any
    pa
  where
    grd1 : pa ∈ patients
    grd2 : pa ∉ visited
    grd3 : pa ∉ ran(emergency_calls)
  then
    act1 : patients := patients \ {pa}
    act2 : assigned_doctor := {pa} ≪ assigned_doctor
    act3 : last_visit := {pa} ≪ last_visit
  end
Event DisconnectAgent ≐
extends DisconnectAgent
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ med_agents
    grd2 : ma ∉ disconnected
  then
    act1 : disconnected := disconnected ∪ {ma}
    act2 : timer(ma) := active
  end
Event ReconnectionSuccessful ≐

```

**extends** *ReconnectionSuccessful*

**any**

    ma

**where**

    grd1 : ma ∈ disconnected

    grd2 : timer(ma) = active

**then**

    act1 : timer(ma) := inactive

    act2 : disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}

**end**

**Event** *ReconnectionFailed*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *ReconnectionFailed*

**any**

    ma

**where**

    grd1 : ma ∈ disconnected

    grd2 : timer(ma) = active

**then**

    act1 : timer(ma) := timeout

**end**

**Event** *NormalAgentLeaving*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *NormalAgentLeaving*

**any**

    ma

**where**

    grd1 : ma ∈ med\_agents

    grd2 : ma  $\notin$  ran(assigned\_doctor)

    grd3 : ma  $\notin$  last\_visit[visited]

    grd4 : ma  $\notin$  disconnected

    grd5 : ma  $\notin$  ran(accepted\_calls)

**then**

    act1 : med\_agents := med\_agents \ {ma}

    act2 : timer := {ma}  $\triangleleft$  timer

**end**

**Event** *NormalReassignDoctor*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *NormalReassignDoctor*

**any**

    ma

    ma\_new

**where**

    grd1 : ma ∈ ran(assigned\_doctor)

```

    grd2 : ma ∉ last_visit[visited]
    grd3 : ma_new ∈ med_agents
    grd4 : ma ≠ ma_new
    grd5 : ma ∉ disconnected
    grd6 : ma ∉ ran(accepted_calls)
  then
    act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    act2 : assigned_doctor := assigned_doctor ◁ (dom(assigned_doctor ▷
      {ma}) × {ma_new})
    act3 : timer := {ma} ◁ timer
  end
Event DetectFailedAgent ≐
extends DetectFailedAgent
  any
    ma
    ma_new
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ ran(assigned_doctor)
    grd2 : ma ∉ last_visit[visited]
    grd3 : ma_new ∈ med_agents
    grd4 : ma ≠ ma_new
    grd5 : ma ∈ disconnected
    grd6 : timer(ma) = timeout
    grd7 : ma_new ∉ disconnected ∨ (ma_new ∈ disconnected ∧
      timer(ma_new) = active)
  then
    act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    act2 : assigned_doctor := assigned_doctor ◁ (dom(assigned_doctor ▷
      {ma}) × {ma_new})
    act3 : disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}
    act4 : timer := {ma} ◁ timer
    act5 : accepted_calls := accepted_calls ▷ {ma}
  end
Event DetectFailedFreeAgent ≐
extends DetectFailedFreeAgent
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ med_agents
    grd2 : ma ∉ ran(assigned_doctor)
    grd3 : ma ∉ last_visit[visited]
    grd4 : ma ∈ disconnected

```

```

    grd5 : timer(ma) = timeout
  then
    act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    act2 : disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}
    act3 : timer := {ma}  $\triangleleft$  timer
    act4 : accepted_calls := accepted_calls  $\triangleright$  {ma}
  end
Event EmergencyCall  $\hat{=}$ 
Status convergent
  any
    pa
    ec
  where
    grd1 : pa  $\in$  patients
    grd2 : ec  $\in$  ALARMS
    grd3 : ec  $\notin$  dom(emergency_calls)
    grd4 : pa  $\notin$  ran(emergency_calls)
  then
    act1 : emergency_calls := emergency_calls  $\cup$  {ec  $\mapsto$  pa}
  end
Event HandlingEmergencyCall  $\hat{=}$ 
Status convergent
  any
    ec
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ec  $\in$  dom(emergency_calls)
    grd2 : ec  $\notin$  dom(accepted_calls)
    grd3 : ma  $\in$  med_agents
    grd4 : ma  $\notin$  disconnected
  then
    act1 : accepted_calls := accepted_calls  $\cup$  {ec  $\mapsto$  ma}
  end
Event EmergencyVisitBegin  $\hat{=}$ 
refines VisitBegin
  any
    ec
  where
    grd1 : ec  $\in$  dom(accepted_calls)
    grd2 : emergency_calls(ec)  $\notin$  visited
    grd3 : accepted_calls(ec)  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]

```

```

with
  ma : ma = accepted_calls(ec)
  pa : pa = emergency_calls(ec)
then
  act1 : last_visit(emergency_calls(ec)) := accepted_calls(ec)
  act2 : visited := visited  $\cup$  {emergency_calls(ec)}
  act3 : emergency_calls := emergency_calls \ {ec  $\mapsto$  emergency_calls(ec)}
  act4 : accepted_calls := accepted_calls \ {ec  $\mapsto$  accepted_calls(ec)}
end
Event RegularVisitBegin  $\hat{=}$ 
extends VisitBegin
  any
    ma
    pa
  where
    grd1 : ma  $\in$  med_agents
    grd2 : pa  $\in$  patients
    grd3 : pa  $\notin$  visited
    grd4 : ma  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
    grd5 : pa  $\notin$  ran(emergency_calls)
  then
    act1 : last_visit(pa) := ma
    act2 : visited := visited  $\cup$  {pa}
  end
Event VisitEnd  $\hat{=}$ 
extends VisitEnd
  any
    pa
  where
    grd1 : pa  $\in$  visited
  then
    act1 : visited := visited \ {pa}
  end
VARIANT
  card(ALARMS \ dom(emergency_calls)) + card(ALARMS \ dom(accepted_calls))

END

```

**CONTEXT** c3

**EXTENDS** c2

**SETS**

ALARMS

**AXIOMS**

axm1 : *finite*(ALARMS)

**END**

**MACHINE** Hospital4

**REFINES** Hospital3

**SEES** c3

**VARIABLES**

assigned\_doctor  
accepted\_calls  
disconnected  
emergency\_calls  
last\_visit  
med\_agents  
patients  
timer  
visited  
ec\_handling  
directed  
candidate\_found  
occupied  
current\_call

**INVARIANTS**

*inv1* :  $ec\_handling \in \text{BOOL}$

*inv2* :  $candidate\_found \in \text{BOOL}$

*inv3* :  $directed \in \text{ALARMS} \leftrightarrow med\_agents$

*inv4* :  $occupied \subseteq med\_agents$

*inv5* :  $dom(directed) \subseteq dom(emergency\_calls)$

*inv6* :  $accepted\_calls \subseteq directed$

*inv7* :  $current\_call \in \text{ALARMS}$

*inv8* :  $ec\_handling = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow current\_call \in dom(emergency\_calls)$

*inv9* :  $candidate\_found = \text{TRUE} \wedge ec\_handling = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow current\_call \in dom(directed)$

*inv10* :  $ec\_handling = \text{FALSE} \Rightarrow candidate\_found = \text{FALSE}$

*inv11* :  $ec\_handling = \text{TRUE} \wedge candidate\_found = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow directed(current\_call) \notin occupied$

*inv12* :  $ec\_handling = \text{FALSE} \Rightarrow occupied = \emptyset$

*inv13* :  $ec\_handling = \text{TRUE} \Rightarrow current\_call \notin dom(accepted\_calls)$

**EVENTS**

**Initialisation**

*extended*

```

begin
  act1 : med_agents :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act2 : patients :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act3 : assigned_doctor :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act4 : last_visit :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act5 : visited :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act6 : disconnected :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act7 : timer :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act8 : emergency_calls :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act9 : accepted_calls :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act10 : ec_handling := FALSE
  act11 : candidate_found := FALSE
  act12 : directed :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act13 : occupied :=  $\emptyset$ 
  act14 : current_call :∈ ALARMS
end

Event ActivateAgent  $\hat{=}$ 
extends ActivateAgent
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ MEDSTAFF
    grd2 : ma  $\notin$  med_agents
  then
    act1 : med_agents := med_agents  $\cup$  {ma}
    act2 : timer(ma) := inactive
  end

Event PatientArrival  $\hat{=}$ 
extends PatientArrival
  any
    pa
    ma
  where
    grd1 : pa ∈ PATIENTS
    grd2 : pa  $\notin$  patients
    grd3 : ma ∈ med_agents
  then
    act1 : patients := patients  $\cup$  {pa}
    act2 : assigned_doctor(pa) := ma
  end

Event PatientDischarge  $\hat{=}$ 

```



```

extends PatientDischarge
  any
    pa
  where
    grd1 : pa ∈ patients
    grd2 : pa ∉ visited
    grd3 : pa ∉ ran(emergency_calls)
  then
    act1 : patients := patients \ {pa}
    act2 : assigned_doctor := {pa} ≪ assigned_doctor
    act3 : last_visit := {pa} ≪ last_visit
  end
Event DisconnectAgent ≐
extends DisconnectAgent
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ med_agents
    grd2 : ma ∉ disconnected
    grd3 : ec_handling = FALSE
  then
    act1 : disconnected := disconnected ∪ {ma}
    act2 : timer(ma) := active
  end
Event ReconnectionSuccessful ≐
extends ReconnectionSuccessful
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ disconnected
    grd2 : timer(ma) = active
  then
    act1 : timer(ma) := inactive
    act2 : disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}
  end
Event ReconnectionFailed ≐
extends ReconnectionFailed
  any
    ma
  where
    grd1 : ma ∈ disconnected

```

```

    grd2 : timer(ma) = active
  then
    act1 : timer(ma) := timeout
  end
end
Event NormalAgentLeaving  $\hat{=}$ 
extends NormalAgentLeaving
any
  ma
where
  grd1 : ma  $\in$  med_agents
  grd2 : ma  $\notin$  ran(assigned_doctor)
  grd3 : ma  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
  grd4 : ma  $\notin$  disconnected
  grd5 : ma  $\notin$  ran(accepted_calls)
  grd6 : ma  $\notin$  ran(directed)
then
  act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
  act2 : timer := {ma}  $\triangleleft$  timer
  act3 : occupied := occupied \ {ma}
end
Event NormalReassignDoctor  $\hat{=}$ 
extends NormalReassignDoctor
any
  ma
  ma_new
where
  grd1 : ma  $\in$  ran(assigned_doctor)
  grd2 : ma  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
  grd3 : ma_new  $\in$  med_agents
  grd4 : ma  $\neq$  ma_new
  grd5 : ma  $\notin$  disconnected
  grd6 : ma  $\notin$  ran(accepted_calls)
  grd7 : ma  $\notin$  ran(directed)
then
  act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
  act2 : assigned_doctor := assigned_doctor  $\triangleleft$  (dom(assigned_doctor)  $\triangleright$ 
    {ma})  $\times$  {ma_new})
  act3 : timer := {ma}  $\triangleleft$  timer
  act4 : occupied := occupied \ {ma}
end
Event DetectFailedFreeAgent  $\hat{=}$ 

```

**extends** *DetectFailedFreeAgent*

**any**

ma

**where**

grd1 : ma  $\in$  med\_agents  
grd2 : ma  $\notin$  ran(assigned\_doctor)  
grd3 : ma  $\notin$  last\_visit[visited]  
grd4 : ma  $\in$  disconnected  
grd5 : timer(ma) = timeout  
grd6 : ma  $\notin$  ran(directed)

**then**

act1 : med\_agents := med\_agents  $\setminus$  {ma}  
act2 : disconnected := disconnected  $\setminus$  {ma}  
act3 : timer := {ma}  $\triangleleft$  timer  
act4 : accepted\_calls := accepted\_calls  $\triangleright$  {ma}  
act5 : occupied := occupied  $\setminus$  {ma}

**end**

**Event** *DetectFailedAgent*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *DetectFailedAgent*

**any**

ma

ma\_new

**where**

grd1 : ma  $\in$  ran(assigned\_doctor)  
grd2 : ma  $\notin$  last\_visit[visited]  
grd3 : ma\_new  $\in$  med\_agents  
grd4 : ma  $\neq$  ma\_new  
grd5 : ma  $\in$  disconnected  
grd6 : timer(ma) = timeout  
grd7 : ma\_new  $\notin$  disconnected  $\vee$  (ma\_new  $\in$  disconnected  $\wedge$   
timer(ma\_new) = active)  
grd8 : ma  $\notin$  ran(directed)

**then**

act1 : med\_agents := med\_agents  $\setminus$  {ma}  
act2 : assigned\_doctor := assigned\_doctor  $\triangleleft$  ((dom(assigned\_doctor  $\triangleright$   
{ma})  $\times$  {ma\_new}))  
act3 : disconnected := disconnected  $\setminus$  {ma}  
act4 : timer := {ma}  $\triangleleft$  timer  
act5 : accepted\_calls := accepted\_calls  $\triangleright$  {ma}  
act6 : occupied := occupied  $\setminus$  {ma}

**end**

**Event** *EmergencyCall*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *EmergencyCall*

**any**

pa  
ec

**where**

grd1 : pa ∈ patients  
grd2 : ec ∈ ALARMS  
grd3 : ec ∉ dom(emergency\_calls)  
grd4 : pa ∉ ran(emergency\_calls)

**then**

act1 : emergency\_calls := emergency\_calls ∪ {ec ↦ pa}

**end**

**Event** *ChooseCurrentCall* ≐

**any**

ec

**where**

grd1 : ec ∈ dom(emergency\_calls)  
grd2 : ec ∉ dom(directed)  
grd3 : ec\_handling = FALSE

**then**

act1 : ec\_handling := TRUE  
act2 : current\_call := ec

**end**

**Event** *CallFeed* ≐

**when**

grd1 : ec\_handling = TRUE  
grd2 : candidate\_found = FALSE  
grd3 : assigned\_doctor(emergency\_calls(current\_call)) ∉ disconnected  
grd4 : assigned\_doctor(emergency\_calls(current\_call)) ∉ occupied

**then**

act1 : directed(current\_call) := assigned\_doctor(emergency\_calls(current\_call))  
act2 : candidate\_found := TRUE

**end**

**Event** *ForwardCall* ≐

**any**

ma\_new

**where**

grd1 : ec\_handling = TRUE  
grd2 : candidate\_found = FALSE  
grd3 : assigned\_doctor(emergency\_calls(current\_call)) ∈ disconnected ∨  
assigned\_doctor(emergency\_calls(current\_call)) ∈ occupied

```

    grd4 :  $ma\_new \in med\_agents$ 
    grd5 :  $ma\_new \notin disconnected$ 
    grd6 :  $ma\_new \notin occupied$ 
  then
    act1 :  $directed(current\_call) := ma\_new$ 
    act2 :  $candidate\_found := TRUE$ 
  end
Event AcceptCall  $\hat{=}$ 
refines HandlingEmergencyCall
  when
    grd1 :  $ec\_handling = TRUE$ 
    grd2 :  $candidate\_found = TRUE$ 
    grd3 :  $current\_call \in dom(emergency\_calls)$ 
    grd4 :  $current\_call \notin dom(accepted\_calls)$ 
    grd5 :  $directed(current\_call) \notin disconnected$ 
  with
    ec :  $ec = current\_call$ 
    ma :  $ma = directed(current\_call)$ 
  then
    act1 :  $accepted\_calls(current\_call) := directed(current\_call)$ 
    act2 :  $ec\_handling := FALSE$ 
    act3 :  $candidate\_found := FALSE$ 
    act4 :  $occupied := \emptyset$ 
  end
Event RejectCall  $\hat{=}$ 
Status convergent
  when
    grd1 :  $ec\_handling = TRUE$ 
    grd2 :  $candidate\_found = TRUE$ 
    grd3 :  $card(med\_agents \setminus occupied) \geq 2$ 
  then
    act1 :  $occupied := occupied \cup \{directed(current\_call)\}$ 
    act2 :  $candidate\_found := FALSE$ 
  end
Event ForcedAcceptCall  $\hat{=}$ 
refines HandlingEmergencyCall
  when
    grd1 :  $ec\_handling = TRUE$ 
    grd2 :  $candidate\_found = TRUE$ 
    grd3 :  $current\_call \in dom(emergency\_calls)$ 
    grd4 :  $current\_call \notin dom(accepted\_calls)$ 

```

```

    grd5 : directed(current_call)  $\notin$  disconnected
    grd6 : card(med_agents \ occupied) = 1
with
    ec : ec = current_call
    ma : ma = directed(current_call)
then
    act1 : accepted_calls(current_call) := directed(current_call)
    act2 : ec_handling := FALSE
    act3 : candidate_found := FALSE
    act4 : occupied :=  $\emptyset$ 
end
Event EmergencyVisitBegin  $\hat{=}$ 
extends EmergencyVisitBegin
any
    ec
where
    grd1 : ec  $\in$  dom(accepted_calls)
    grd2 : emergency_calls(ec)  $\notin$  visited
    grd3 : accepted_calls(ec)  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
    grd4 : accepted_calls(ec)  $\notin$  disconnected
then
    act1 : last_visit(emergency_calls(ec)) := accepted_calls(ec)
    act2 : visited := visited  $\cup$  {emergency_calls(ec)}
    act3 : emergency_calls := emergency_calls \ {ec  $\mapsto$  emergency_calls(ec)}
    act4 : accepted_calls := accepted_calls \ {ec  $\mapsto$  accepted_calls(ec)}
    act5 : directed := {ec}  $\triangleleft$  directed
end
Event RegularVisitBegin  $\hat{=}$ 
extends RegularVisitBegin
any
    ma
    pa
where
    grd1 : ma  $\in$  med_agents
    grd2 : pa  $\in$  patients
    grd3 : pa  $\notin$  visited
    grd4 : ma  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
    grd5 : pa  $\notin$  ran(emergency_calls)
then
    act1 : last_visit(pa) := ma
    act2 : visited := visited  $\cup$  {pa}

```

```
end
Event VisitEnd  $\hat{=}$ 
extends VisitEnd
  any
    pa
  where
    grd1 : pa  $\in$  visited
  then
    act1 : visited := visited \ {pa}
  end
VARIANT
  card(med_agents \ occupied)
END
```

**MACHINE** Hospital5

**REFINES** Hospital4

**SEES** c4

**VARIABLES**

accepted\_calls  
assigned\_doctor  
directed  
disconnected  
emergency\_calls  
last\_visit  
med\_agents  
patients  
timer  
record  
scopes  
ec\_handling  
ma\_data  
visited  
occupied  
candidate\_found  
current\_call

**INVARIANTS**

*inv1* :  $record \in patients \rightarrow \mathbb{P}(DATA)$   
*inv2* :  $ma\_data \in med\_agents \leftrightarrow \mathbb{P}(DATA)$   
*inv3* :  $scopes \in ScopeName \leftrightarrow med\_agents$   
*inv4* :  $\forall ma. ma \in ran(scopes) \Leftrightarrow ma \in dom(ma\_data)$   
*inv5* :  $\forall ma. ma \in disconnected \Rightarrow ma \notin ran(scopes)$   
*inv6* :  $\forall ma. ma \in ran(visited \triangleleft last\_visit) \Rightarrow ma \in ran(scopes)$   
*inv7* :  $\forall ma, pa. (pa \mapsto ma) \in (visited \triangleleft last\_visit) \Rightarrow ma\_data(ma) = record(pa)$   
*inv8* :  $\forall pa. pa \in visited \Rightarrow last\_visit(pa) \in ran(scopes)$   
*inv9* :  $(visited \triangleleft last\_visit) \in patients \leftrightarrow med\_agents$

**EVENTS**

**Initialisation**

*extended*

**begin**

*act1* :  $med\_agents := \emptyset$



```

act2 : patients :=  $\emptyset$ 
act3 : assigned_doctor :=  $\emptyset$ 
act4 : last_visit :=  $\emptyset$ 
act5 : visited :=  $\emptyset$ 
act6 : disconnected :=  $\emptyset$ 
act7 : timer :=  $\emptyset$ 
act8 : emergency_calls :=  $\emptyset$ 
act9 : accepted_calls :=  $\emptyset$ 
act10 : ec_handling := FALSE
act11 : candidate_found := FALSE
act12 : directed :=  $\emptyset$ 
act13 : occupied :=  $\emptyset$ 
act14 : current_call  $\in$  ALARMS
act15 : record :=  $\emptyset$ 
act16 : scopes :=  $\emptyset$ 
act17 : ma_data :=  $\emptyset$ 

```

**end**

**Event** *ActivateAgent*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *ActivateAgent*

**any**

ma

**where**

grd1 : ma  $\in$  MEDSTAFF

grd2 : ma  $\notin$  med\_agents

**then**

act1 : med\_agents := med\_agents  $\cup$  {ma}

act2 : timer(ma) := inactive

**end**

**Event** *PatientArrival*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *PatientArrival*

**any**

pa

ma

da

**where**

grd1 : pa  $\in$  PATIENTS

grd2 : pa  $\notin$  patients

grd3 : ma  $\in$  med\_agents

grd4 : da  $\subseteq$  DATA

**then**

act1 : patients := patients  $\cup$  {pa}

act2 : assigned\_doctor(pa) := ma

```

        act3 : record(pa) := da
    end
Event PatientDischarge  $\hat{=}$ 
extends PatientDischarge
    any
        pa
    where
        grd1 : pa  $\in$  patients
        grd2 : pa  $\notin$  visited
        grd3 : pa  $\notin$  ran(emergency_calls)
    then
        act1 : patients := patients \ {pa}
        act2 : assigned_doctor := {pa}  $\triangleleft$  assigned_doctor
        act3 : last_visit := {pa}  $\triangleleft$  last_visit
        act4 : record := {pa}  $\triangleleft$  record
    end
Event DisconnectAgent  $\hat{=}$ 
extends DisconnectAgent
    any
        ma
    where
        grd1 : ma  $\in$  med_agents
        grd2 : ma  $\notin$  disconnected
        grd3 : ec_handling = FALSE
        grd4 : ma  $\notin$  ran(scopes)
    then
        act1 : disconnected := disconnected  $\cup$  {ma}
        act2 : timer(ma) := active
    end
Event ReconnectionSuccessful  $\hat{=}$ 
extends ReconnectionSuccessful
    any
        ma
    where
        grd1 : ma  $\in$  disconnected
        grd2 : timer(ma) = active
    then
        act1 : timer(ma) := inactive
        act2 : disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}
    end
Event ReconnectionFailed  $\hat{=}$ 

```

**extends** *ReconnectionFailed*

**any**

ma

**where**

grd1 : ma ∈ disconnected

grd2 : timer(ma) = active

**then**

act1 : timer(ma) := timeout

**end**

**Event** *NormalAgentLeaving*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *NormalAgentLeaving*

**any**

ma

**where**

grd1 : ma ∈ med\_agents

grd2 : ma  $\notin$  ran(assigned\_doctor)

grd3 : ma  $\notin$  last\_visit[visited]

grd4 : ma  $\notin$  disconnected

grd5 : ma  $\notin$  ran(accepted\_calls)

grd6 : ma  $\notin$  ran(directed)

grd7 : ma  $\notin$  ran(scopes)

**then**

act1 : med\_agents := med\_agents \ {ma}

act2 : timer := {ma}  $\triangleleft$  timer

act3 : occupied := occupied \ {ma}

**end**

**Event** *NormalReassignDoctor*  $\hat{=}$

**extends** *NormalReassignDoctor*

**any**

ma

ma\_new

**where**

grd1 : ma ∈ ran(assigned\_doctor)

grd2 : ma  $\notin$  last\_visit[visited]

grd3 : ma\_new ∈ med\_agents

grd4 : ma  $\neq$  ma\_new

grd5 : ma  $\notin$  disconnected

grd6 : ma  $\notin$  ran(accepted\_calls)

grd7 : ma  $\notin$  ran(directed)

grd8 : ma  $\notin$  ran(scopes)

**then**

```

act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
act2 : assigned_doctor := assigned_doctor  $\Leftarrow$  (dom(assigned_doctor  $\triangleright$ 
    {ma})  $\times$  {ma_new})
act3 : timer := {ma}  $\Leftarrow$  timer
act4 : occupied := occupied \ {ma}
end
Event DetectFailedFreeAgent  $\hat{=}$ 
extends DetectFailedFreeAgent
any
    ma
where
    grd1 : ma  $\in$  med_agents
    grd2 : ma  $\notin$  ran(assigned_doctor)
    grd3 : ma  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
    grd4 : ma  $\in$  disconnected
    grd5 : timer(ma) = timeout
    grd6 : ma  $\notin$  ran(directed)
then
    act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
    act2 : disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}
    act3 : timer := {ma}  $\Leftarrow$  timer
    act4 : accepted_calls := accepted_calls  $\triangleright$  {ma}
    act5 : occupied := occupied \ {ma}
    act6 : scopes := scopes  $\triangleright$  {ma}
    act7 : ma_data := {ma}  $\Leftarrow$  ma_data
end
Event DetectFailedAgent  $\hat{=}$ 
extends DetectFailedAgent
any
    ma
    ma_new
where
    grd1 : ma  $\in$  ran(assigned_doctor)
    grd2 : ma  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
    grd3 : ma_new  $\in$  med_agents
    grd4 : ma  $\neq$  ma_new
    grd5 : ma  $\in$  disconnected
    grd6 : timer(ma) = timeout
    grd7 : ma_new  $\notin$  disconnected  $\vee$  (ma_new  $\in$  disconnected  $\wedge$ 
        timer(ma_new) = active)
    grd8 : ma  $\notin$  ran(directed)
then

```

```

act1 : med_agents := med_agents \ {ma}
act2 : assigned_doctor := assigned_doctor  $\Leftarrow$  (dom(assigned_doctor  $\triangleright$ 
    {ma})  $\times$  {ma_new})
act3 : disconnected := disconnected \ {ma}
act4 : timer := {ma}  $\Leftarrow$  timer
act5 : accepted_calls := accepted_calls  $\triangleright$  {ma}
act6 : occupied := occupied \ {ma}
act7 : scopes := scopes  $\triangleright$  {ma}
act8 : ma_data := {ma}  $\Leftarrow$  ma_data
end
Event EmergencyCall  $\hat{=}$ 
extends EmergencyCall
  any
    pa
    ec
  where
    grd1 : pa  $\in$  patients
    grd2 : ec  $\in$  ALARMS
    grd3 : ec  $\notin$  dom(emergency_calls)
    grd4 : pa  $\notin$  ran(emergency_calls)
  then
    act1 : emergency_calls := emergency_calls  $\cup$  {ec  $\mapsto$  pa}
  end
Event ChooseCurrentCall  $\hat{=}$ 
extends ChooseCurrentCall
  any
    ec
  where
    grd1 : ec  $\in$  dom(emergency_calls)
    grd2 : ec  $\notin$  dom(directed)
    grd3 : ec.handling = FALSE
  then
    act1 : ec.handling := TRUE
    act2 : current_call := ec
  end
Event CallFeed  $\hat{=}$ 
extends CallFeed
  when
    grd1 : ec.handling = TRUE
    grd2 : candidate_found = FALSE
    grd3 : assigned_doctor(emergency_calls(current_call))  $\notin$  disconnected

```

```

    grd4 : assigned_doctor(emergency_calls(current_call))  $\notin$  occupied
  then
    act1 : directed(current_call) := assigned_doctor(emergency_calls(current_ca
    act2 : candidate_found := TRUE
  end
Event AcceptCall  $\hat{=}$ 
extends AcceptCall
  when
    grd1 : ec_handling = TRUE
    grd2 : candidate_found = TRUE
    grd3 : current_call  $\in$  dom(emergency_calls)
    grd4 : current_call  $\notin$  dom(accepted_calls)
    grd5 : directed(current_call)  $\notin$  disconnected
  then
    act1 : accepted_calls(current_call) := directed(current_call)
    act2 : ec_handling := FALSE
    act3 : candidate_found := FALSE
    act4 : occupied :=  $\emptyset$ 
  end
Event RejectCall  $\hat{=}$ 
extends RejectCall
  when
    grd1 : ec_handling = TRUE
    grd2 : candidate_found = TRUE
    grd3 : card(med_agents \ occupied)  $\geq$  2
  then
    act1 : occupied := occupied  $\cup$  {directed(current_call)}
    act2 : candidate_found := FALSE
  end
Event ForwardCall  $\hat{=}$ 
extends ForwardCall
  any
    ma_new
  where
    grd1 : ec_handling = TRUE
    grd2 : candidate_found = FALSE
    grd3 : assigned_doctor(emergency_calls(current_call))  $\in$  disconnected  $\vee$ 
      assigned_doctor(emergency_calls(current_call))  $\in$  occupied
    grd4 : ma_new  $\in$  med_agents
    grd5 : ma_new  $\notin$  disconnected
    grd6 : ma_new  $\notin$  occupied

```

```

    then
      act1 : directed(current_call) := ma_new
      act2 : candidate_found := TRUE
    end
  Event ForcedAcceptCall  $\hat{=}$ 
  extends ForcedAcceptCall
  when
    grd1 : ec_handling = TRUE
    grd2 : candidate_found = TRUE
    grd3 : current_call  $\in$  dom(emergency_calls)
    grd4 : current_call  $\notin$  dom(accepted_calls)
    grd5 : directed(current_call)  $\notin$  disconnected
    grd6 : card(med_agents \ occupied) = 1
  then
    act1 : accepted_calls(current_call) := directed(current_call)
    act2 : ec_handling := FALSE
    act3 : candidate_found := FALSE
    act4 : occupied :=  $\emptyset$ 
  end
  Event EmergencyEnterScope  $\hat{=}$ 
  extends EmergencyVisitBegin
  any
    ec
    sn
  where
    grd1 : ec  $\in$  dom(accepted_calls)
    grd2 : emergency_calls(ec)  $\notin$  visited
    grd3 : accepted_calls(ec)  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
    grd4 : accepted_calls(ec)  $\notin$  disconnected
    grd5 : sn  $\in$  ScopeName
    grd6 : sn  $\notin$  dom(scopes)
    grd7 : accepted_calls(ec)  $\notin$  ran(scopes)
    grd8 : accepted_calls(ec)  $\notin$  disconnected
  then
    act1 : last_visit(emergency_calls(ec)) := accepted_calls(ec)
    act2 : visited := visited  $\cup$  {emergency_calls(ec)}
    act3 : emergency_calls := emergency_calls \ {ec  $\mapsto$  emergency_calls(ec)}
    act4 : accepted_calls := accepted_calls \ {ec  $\mapsto$  accepted_calls(ec)}
    act5 : directed := {ec}  $\triangleleft$  directed
    act6 : scopes(sn) := accepted_calls(ec)
    act7 : ma_data(accepted_calls(ec)) := record(emergency_calls(ec))
  end
end

```

```

Event RegularEnterScope  $\hat{=}$ 
extends RegularVisitBegin
  any
    ma
    pa
    sn
  where
    grd1 : ma  $\in$  med_agents
    grd2 : pa  $\in$  patients
    grd3 : pa  $\notin$  visited
    grd4 : ma  $\notin$  last_visit[visited]
    grd5 : pa  $\notin$  ran(emergency_calls)
    grd6 : sn  $\in$  ScopeName
    grd7 : sn  $\notin$  dom(scopes)
    grd8 : ma  $\notin$  ran(scopes)
    grd9 : ma  $\notin$  disconnected
  then
    act1 : last_visit(pa) := ma
    act2 : visited := visited  $\cup$  {pa}
    act3 : scopes := scopes  $\cup$  {sn  $\mapsto$  ma}
    act4 : ma_data(ma) := record(pa)
  end
Event ModifyRecord  $\hat{=}$ 
  any
    ma
    sn
    pa
    da_new
  where
    grd1 : (sn  $\mapsto$  ma)  $\in$  scopes
    grd2 : pa  $\in$  dom(last_visit)
    grd3 : last_visit(pa) = ma
    grd4 : pa  $\in$  visited
    grd5 : da_new  $\in$   $\mathbb{P}$ (DATA)
    grd6 : da_new  $\neq$   $\emptyset$ 
  then
    act1 : ma_data(ma) := da_new
    act2 : record(pa) := da_new
  end
Event LeaveScope  $\hat{=}$ 
extends VisitEnd

```



```

any
  pa
  sn
where
  grd1 : pa ∈ visited
  grd2 : (sn ↦ last_visit(pa)) ∈ scopes
then
  act1 : visited := visited \ {pa}
  act2 : scopes := scopes ▷ {last_visit(pa)}
  act3 : ma_data := {last_visit(pa)} ◁ ma_data
end
END

CONTEXT c4
EXTENDS c3
SETS
  DATA
  ScopeName
AXIOMS
  axm1 : finite(DATA)
  axm2 : finite(ScopeName)
END

```


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